exploring the factors that explain the conditions and the likely future trends. The objective was to learn more about the fiscal conditions in these other states and how the states have or haven't dealt with the situation. We hope that by considering the fiscal conditions that other state governments have faced perhaps Georgia can learn something from the experiences of those states.
Introduction
The National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO, 2005, p. ix) open their recent edition of The Fiscal Survey of States with the statement that " [s] tate fiscal conditions rebounded noticeably in fiscal 2005." This nationwide recovery was characterized by a marked improvement in revenues that allowed states to restore much of the funding to programs that were severely cut in the nationwide recession that began in 2001. State budget officers also report that general fund expenditures across all states are expected to grow by 6.3 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2006-07, which is just below the 6.4 percent average recorded over the last 28 years.
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In FY 2005-06 all states reported an expected $38.5 billion end-of-year surplus that is equivalent to 6.9 percent of all expected general fund expenditures. 2 However, as shown in Figure 1 , this nationwide average masks important differences in how well some states have recovered from the last downturn. More than one-third of the states are expected to display year-end reserves that are less than 4.9 percent.
1 General fund expenditures are from general revenue sources that comprise all state revenue except that classified as liquor store, utility, or insurance trust revenue. General revenue is classified by four main categories: taxes, intergovernmental revenue, current charges, and miscellaneous general revenue. For details see http://www.census.gov/govs/www/class.html. 2 As defined by NASBO (2005, p. 11) , the end-of-year surplus for a state includes both an ending balance between general fund revenue and expenditures and any amount accumulated in a budget stabilization (rainy-day) fund.
FIGURE 1. EXPECTED YEAR-END STATE GOVERNMENTS RESERVES AS A PERCENT OF EXPENDITURES, FY 2005-06
Black -5.0% or more (33 states) Dark Gray -3.0 to 4.9% (8 states) Light Gray -1.0 to 2.9% (6 states) White -Less than 1.0% (3 states) In an article titled "State Budgets: Bliss or Blues," Eckl (2005) expects a future of unsustainable state budgets in the United States to be more the rule than the exception. On a scale of one to ten (with ten being her assessment of a state most at risk for exhibiting factors expected to contribute to future structural state budget deficits), she only awards Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin a score below a five. California is rated a seven, and there are 18 states thought to be at even greater risk. Eckl's (p. 24) conclusion on future state budget trends is that "cutting spending, raising taxes -or both -will become painful realities."
Using California as a case study, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors that have produced the ominous budget outlook characterized by Figure 2 . I do this first by examining budget patterns for the State of California to see if there is
The "Roller Coaster" of California State Budgeting After Proposition 13 4 any evidence that they differ from what has been observed for states as a whole. Sections 3 through 7 are then used to describe some of the specifics circumstances in California -constitutional restrictions, revenue reliance, demographics, future concerns, and public opinion -that are responsible for the previous patterns observed, and future patterns expected in California state government expenditures and revenue. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a description of how the State's budget faired during the last business cycle and suggested policy reforms that could help alter the expected course of California's budget outcomes over such future cycles. assessments rolled back to 1975 levels and allowed to increase a maximum of two percent per year unless sold, new "special" taxes require a two-thirds approval by voters, and property tax revenue is to be distributed among local governments "according to law"), it is now widely believed to have produced a legacy of further "unintended consequences" on California's system of state-local public finances (Chapman, 1998 California chooses to increase its spending at a higher (lower) rate than all states during boom (bust) years in the State's economy. Later I will argue this is driven in large part by the highly pro-cyclical sources of revenue that it primarily relies on.
The "Roller Coaster" of California State Budgeting After Proposition 13 6   FIGURE 3. CALIFORNIA % CHANGE IN REAL GENERAL FUND EXPENDITURE   06  05  04  03  02  01  00  99  98  97  96  95  94  93  92  91  90  89  88  87  86  85  84  83  82  81  80 6  05  04  03  02  01  00  99  98  97  96  95  94  93  92  91  90  89  88  87  86  85  84  83  82  81  80 06  05  04  03  02  01  00  99  98  97  96  95  94  93  92  91  90  89  88  87  86  85  84  83  82  81  80 Table  9 , p. 14. Figure 5 shows for a given fiscal year the ratio of the budget stabilization fund to general fund expenditures for both California (dashed line) and aggregated for all states (solid line). When these measures fall below the middle line, the yearly operating budget has gone negative enough that the budget stabilization fund cannot cover it and it also turns negative. Notice that deficits of this magnitude are not all that unusual in California, while they have never occurred in the aggregate measure calculated for all states. experience similar economic and demographic changes, they too are more likely to experience, as shown in Figure 5 , the "Californication" of their state's budget cycles. 3 The explanation first examined is the fiscal restrictions imbedded in California's 1879 state constitution and the interconnected chain of additional restrictions placed in California's constitution after, and to a large part because of, the passage of Proposition 13.
III. Fiscal Restrictions in California's Constitution
The only states that require a super-majority for the annual passage of a state budget are Arkansas, California, and Rhode Island. The two-thirds supermajority requirement in California dates back to the populist constitution it adopted in 1879.
Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, a two-thirds majority has also been required in the State for any "changes in state taxes enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues;" however, legislative actions that decrease state tax revenues can be enacted with only a simple majority (California Budget Project, 2004 
Proposition 62
November 1986 New local general taxes require two-thirds approval of governing body and a majority of local voters.
Proposition 218
November 1996 Further limits authority of local governments to impose taxes, assessments and fees. Two-thirds of voters must approve any new local non-general taxes.
Proposition 98 November 1988
Guarantees a minimum level of state general fund revenues be devoted to funding K-14 public education. Guaranteed amount is calculated based upon greater of three tests: (1) % received equal to % received in FY 86-87 (approx. 40%), (2) as much as received previous year adjusted for enrollment, or (3) same as "(2)" except growth factor is equal to growth in per-capita general fund revenues plus ½%. Intended to act as a floor, in practice worked as a ceiling typical equal to 40 -45% of state's general fund revenue going to K-14.
Proposition 99
November 1988 Imposes an additional $0.25 tax on cigarette pack and limits revenue to health-related uses.
Proposition 172
November 1993 Increases state general sales tax by 0.5% and dedicates revenue to public safety programs.
Proposition 10
November 1998 Imposes an additional $0.25 tax on cigarette pack and limits revenue to childhood development programs.
Proposition 42
March 2002 Selective sales taxes collected on gasoline are permanently earmarked for transportation uses only.
Proposition 49
November 2002 Increases state grants to public K-12 schools for before and after school programs. No additional funding source prescribed. Currently close to $0.5 billion of state spending devoted to it. Imposes a 1% additional tax on personal income earned in the state over $1 million. Revenue is used to fund mental health services. Expected to raise $0.8 billion in FY 2006-07.
Proposition 1A
November 2004 After the passage of Proposition 13, local property taxes were paid to California counties and the state had the constitutional right to distribute those revenues to cities and school districts in the county, and the county government in a manner they chose. During times of statewide fiscal stress, this often resulted in the state reducing payments to counties and cities and shifting them to school districts to meet constitutionally-imposed Proposition 98 funding requirements. This constitutional amendment freezes the current allocation in a county in place unless the Governor declares a fiscal emergency and agrees to repay imposed transfers after three years. Also requires the State to fully fund local mandates. The historical instability observed in the State of California's fiscal situation may have also been related to variations in previous spending patterns. In addition, projected demographic trends could make the State's future fiscal instability even worse. I turn to a review of these issues next.
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V. Previous Spending and Future Demographics
Has the fiscal instability in California's state budget been caused at all by upward spending pressure upon the state since Proposition 13? Earlier there was some evidence of this offered in Figure 3 where the percentage change in California's real general fund expenditure rose in most years, and at a rate that was higher than that calculated for all states as a whole. Though, one could argue that these trends As detailed in Figure 11 , California currently spends 62 percent of its general fund budget on K-12 and higher education, and corrections. Most observers consider this portion of the budget untouchable due to the Proposition 98 funding guarantee for primary and secondary public education, the State's historical commitment to its "Master Plan" of offering an accessible higher education to all, and public attitudes that support correctional spending. Of the remaining 38 percent of general fund expenditures, 31 percent is devoted to health and human service spending. As noted in Fisher (2006, p.12) , for states as whole in FY 2001-02, education and correction expenditures made up 36 percent of general expenditure, while health and human service spending accounted for 27 percent. California's expenditure patterns and commitments are quite different than observed for all states as a whole. This difference could lend itself to further fiscal instability given the demographic and related income trends predicted for California.
Throughout the period under observation, the haves and the have-nots in California have been grower farther apart than in the rest of the United States. Figure   12 demonstrates this occurrence well. Notice that the percentage change in family income for the bottom 10 th percentile grew at a much slower rate than for the top 10 th percentile. Though this divergence has occurred throughout the United States, the figure shows that it was more pronounced in California. 
VI. Other Concerns on the Horizon
State budget analyses for the United States as a whole (Eckl, 2005) , and for California in particular (LAO, 2006) , contain caveats of further concerns on the horizon that could make existing warnings of doom for state budgets even worse.
Here I report upon the ones mentioned specifically for California.
In California, as in most states, budget analysts worry over the continuing demands placed upon the statewide primary and secondary public education by the growing accountability movement and the Federal "No Child-Left-Behind" Act.
Regarding this policy concern, California faces the additional demands of a larger The "Roller Coaster" of California State Budgeting After Proposition 13
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Related to Medi-Cal spending, rising health care costs in general could also spell trouble for balancing California's future operating budgets. According to (Benson, 2006) , the State currently pays about $1 billion a year to cover health care premiums for current retirees. But analysts at the LAO estimate that this will not be enough to cover future unfunded liabilities that will fall somewhere between $40 and $70 billion. Subsequently, the LAO has suggested that the State begin putting aside an additional $1 billion a year to meet these obligations. In a related development, the LAO (2006) Majorities of residents (respectively 66 percent, 55 percent, 59 percent, and 51 percent) thought more -not less -money needed to be spent on K-12 public education, health and human services, roads/infrastructure, and universities. Only for the category of corrections did less than a majority favor no spending increase (39 percent felt the same should be spent and 33 percent felt less). In this same survey, when residents were asked what taxes they favored to alleviate California's structural deficit, the only favorable majority responses derived were 66 percent preferring an increase in the top personal income tax bracket and 70 percent preferring an increased cigarette tax. Realizing that respondents in these type of surveys naturally gravitate toward a "free lunch" perspective, the PPIC survey explicitly asked residents whether they would rather pay higher taxes and have a state government that provides more services, or pay less taxes and get less services. Higher taxes and services prevailed at 56 percent, with 36 percent choosing the alternative, and 8 percent not knowing how to respond.
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In the PPIC survey conducted in January 2006, California residents were also asked to choose among the public policy issues of education, state budget, immigration, economy, health care, crime, and roads, as to which should be of the single most concern for the Governor and Legislature in 2006. Second to only education which received 26 percent support, the state budget garnered 17 percent.
In further support of populist concern over state fiscal matters, 83 percent of the State's residents thought that some of the recent surge in state income tax revenues should be used to reduce the amount of state debt.
VIII. California's Last Business Cycle and Suggestions for Budget Reform
Before I conclude the paper with the suggested reforms to California's budget process and fiscal structure that have been put forth by a variety of past commissions and experts, and offer my own commentary on their political feasibility, let me first take you through a brief synopsis of what went on during the State's last boom-tobust-to-boom period.
California's Last Business Cycle
From the mid-1990s onward, California's economy boomed along with its "dot-coms." There was $50 billion in taxable income from exercised stock options and realized capital gains in the State in 1996. By 2000 these had quadrupled to $200 billion. The tax revenue collected by California from these sources equivalently soared from $4 billion, to nearly $8 billion (Hill, 2002) . In 1998, after campaigning and winning on a platform of the need to better fund public education, Governor Davis, with the support of the Legislature, began a policy of spending larger portion of these revenue windfalls on education, health, and human service programs.
Included among the state expenditure increases were: (1) K-12 teacher salary increases, (2) K-3 class size reduction (which began in 1996 and continues to offer $800 per student annually to districts that reduce these level class sizes to 20 per teacher), (3) additional spending in the State's higher education systems to forestall fee increases, (4) covering county trial court expenses which were previously funded locally, and (5) The "Roller Coaster" of California State Budgeting After Proposition 13 positive operating balance of over $3 billion (as noted earlier in Figure 2 ) and a surplus in its reserve fund of over $9 billion.
In less than 10 years, Californians rode the fiscal roller coaster of going from boom to bust and back to relative boom. Budget experts, analysts, and observers are well aware of the tendency for California's system of state budgeting and finances to produce such a pattern and have offered the solutions discussed next.
Suggested Reforms to California's State Budget Process and Finances
The suggestions put forth to reduce the instability currently inherent in balancing the yearly operating budget of California state government can be broken down into two categories. The first is reforms targeted at changes in the institutions and rules surrounding the budget process itself. The second deals with altering the way California raises revenue for its state and local governments. For each of these two categories I offer a bulleted summary of the major reforms that have been suggested. The first list is of budget process reforms. The items contained in it are drawn from reviews put together by Simmons (2002) and the Institute for Government Studies (2003).
Budget Process Reforms
• Reduce two-thirds voting requirements
To one extent or another, many of the commissions, studies, and individuals that have explored ways to reform the State's budget process have come to the conclusion that its two-thirds vote requirements needs be changed. The California Constitution Revision Commission in 1996 and the California Citizens Budget Commission in 1998 recommended amending the Constitution to only require a simple majority to enact a budget. The California Commission on Tax Policy in the New Economy in 2003 concluded that the vote threshold for approval of local special taxes be reduced to 55 percent. The California Budget Project in 1999 (whose purpose is to represent the well-being of low and middle income Californians) suggested the elimination of all super majority vote requirements across the state, while the California Business Roundtable in 1995 favored the elimination of a super-majority vote requirement for the passage of a state budget, but not for new taxes. The League of Women Voters of California in 1995 believed that if two-thirds vote requirements are kept for taxes, they should also be required for the approval of tax expenditures.
• Create greater fiscal discipline
Previous observers believe that greater discipline could be instilled in the budget process through a better accounting of, and public information campaign on, the magnitude of tax expenditures by the state, a loosening of revenue and spending restrictions currently locked in California's Constitution, a curtailment on future propositions, and the establishment of a truly "reasonable and necessary" prudent state budget reserve fund that is required by the Constitution. For instance, the Speaker's Commission on the California Initiative Process in 1992, the California Constitution Revision Commission, and the California Business Roundtable all suggested that voter approved propositions be subject to allowed modification by the legislature after various periods to remedy the unintended fiscal consequences wrought by their simple majority passage.
• Move to multi-year budgeting
With the hope of allowing policymakers more time to evaluate program effectiveness and to appropriately adjust proposed and current legislation for economic and caseload changes, the State should move to some form of multiyear budgeting. The California Citizens Budget Commission suggested a threeyear perspective, while the Little Hoover Commission in 1995, the California Business Roundtable, and the California League of Women Voters have recommended a two year budget cycle.
• Improve the public's and legislator's understanding of the budget Governor Schwarzenegger's proposed budget for California in FY 2006-07 is nearly 1300 pages long and highly technical. 5 Previous observers of the State's budget process contend that a budget described in this form does not promote public, or even legislative, scrutiny of spending choices, economic forecasts, and program performance. Though state organizations like the Legislative Analyst's Office and Department of Finance, and private organizations like the California Budget Project offer summaries and analyses of the state budget that are easier to digest, the suggestion here is for even more public dissemination of the constraints, trade-offs, and choices necessary in a state budget. 6 The next list of suggested reforms to improve the outcome observed in California state budgeting relate to changing the way that general fund revenue is raised at the state level. Since state finances are so closely tied to local finances in post-Proposition 13 California, some of have also suggested that the only way to truly improve state budget outcomes are reforms to the entire system of state and local finance.
Revenue Reliance Reforms
• Increase state revenue reliance on tax bases more stable over the business cycle
As the previous discussion has made clear, much of the fiscal strife experienced by the State of California can be attributed to approximately a quarter of California's general fund revenue coming from personal income taxes, the high top marginal income rate, the large percentage of households that fall into the top bracket and contribute a large percentage of the income tax revenue raised, and the variability of this revenue due to much of it being in the form of stock options and capital gains. So any reduction in reliance on this tax instrument, that is funded by greater reliance on a more stable tax instrument, would make the State's general revenue flow more predictable and less prone to generating negative operating balances during an economic downturn. Obvious suggestions to do this have been raising the vehicle license fee, raising or instituting other fees/charges, expanding the general sales tax base to include services, and/or instituting a statewide property tax.
• Raise more state revenue If it is not politically possible to raise a more stable stream of general fund revenue in California, some have suggested that a reasonable alternative to reducing the reoccurring pattern of operating deficits in the State is just raising more revenue. Often suggested is a reinstatement of the higher top marginal income tax rates of 10 percent and 11 percent that existed throughout much of the 1990s.
• Reduce local government reliance on state revenue by shifting to greater local tax reliance
Nearly every commission and expert that have studied California's overall system of financing state and local government have come to the conclusion that it is in need of major reform. The California Citizens Budget Commission concluded that local governments need greater fiscal independence. The California Governance Consensus Project in 2002, California Budget Project, California Constitution Revision Commission, and California Business Roundtable all agree and further suggest a significant realignment of state/county public service responsibilities.
The Political Feasibility of Suggested Budget and Revenue Reliance Reforms
Any of the previously suggested reforms, if adopted in California, would likely offer some relief to the boom-bust tendency exhibited in the State's budget after Proposition 13. Objective analyses based in the disciplines of political science and/or public administration broadly support the budget process reforms described above, while the same forms of analyses based in the economics of public finance throw their support (to various degrees) behind the suggested reforms to California's revenue reliance. But the reality in California is that the policy reforms suggested by these analyses would require amending the Constitution and hence approval by a majority of voters. Thus it is essential that the political feasibility of these reforms be fall upon the State's highest earners, the supermajority vote requirement again make its adoption politically difficult. In addition, if this was the only fiscal reform adopted, an argument could be made that it could make the see-sawing of the State's operating deficits worse if the surpluses it generated in good years produces even greater commitments to on-going spending that cannot be met in the bad years.
Perhaps a solution is to legislate that such a personal income tax increase only occurs when the California budget displays a yearly operating deficit.
The revenue reliance reform favored by many academics and policy analysts, but still disliked by a majority of California's voting populous, is a reduction in government dependence on state revenue by shifting to greater local tax reliance.
This would be best achieved through a loosening of the Proposition 13 restriction that property taxation in the state never exceeds 1 percent. Unfortunately, the current populist support for such a proposal is nearly non-existent. Political folklore in the State widely recognizes Proposition 13 as the "third rail" of California politics: touch it as a politician and your political life dies. (Or as Governor Schwarzenegger is paraphrased as telling his elder political advisor Warren Buffet: "Mention changing it one more time and you will do 500 pushups.")
IX. Conclusion
This paper has offered evidence on the variability of California's operating budget over the business cycle and how this variability is unlikely to cease unless budget process and/or revenue reliance reforms are adopted. Of the reforms favored by analysts, I conclude that a reduction in the two-thirds vote requirement to pass a state budget and raise state taxes, and/or an increase in the vehicle license fee rate are "The supposed failures of the process have more to do with the poor performance of the California economy and with the particular partisan divisions of the State than with the specific provisions and political institutions in the California economy."
As recent attempts at policy reforms have demonstrated, maybe just ending the State's poor economic performance and eliminating its political divides would be easier to accomplish than reducing a legislative vote requirement to pass a state 
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